Meaning in Life (Thaddeus Metz)

OVERVIEW

Meaning in Life brings together 10 years of research and contemplation on the topic of meaning. In it, philosophy professor Thaddeus Metz reviews all major previously advanced theories for what confers meaning on a human life. Ultimately, he proposes his own answer, which he finds to be most free of objections and counterintuitive implications.

To be precise, this book explores possible answers regarding the meaning an individual human life can have (not the same as answers for the ultimate meaning of life). PART I, the introduction, distills to:

·        Your whole life and the individual segments of your life confer some amount of meaning, often different kinds.

·        Meaningfulness, rightness (moral goodness), and happiness (pleasurable experience) are not the same thing. One can imagine a life that is happy but meaningless, unhappy but moral, happy but immoral, etc. Similarly, meaninglessness is not the same as absurdity, futility, or worthlessness.

·        Satisfactory answers to questions on meaning in life will be complex and likely involve elements of purposiveness (goal-orientation), transcendence (moving beyond one’s ‘animal nature’), and esteem (admiration).

·        Most philosophers converge on the intuition that what is valuable is the good (moral achievement), the true (inquiry/intellectual reflection), and the beautiful (aesthetic creation) – i.e. that these are the closest we get to objectively positive “final values”

Discarding supernaturalism

In PART II, Metz begins by rejecting the purpose-based meaning perspective, whereby meaning exists only when a purposive God assigns it. Most objections underscore the tension between a God that must be purposive but also eternal and morally good… because how does a being outside of space/time simultaneously operate within a realm of purposes (physical and temporal endings)… and how can a beneficent God require that we fulfill these purposes under threat of eternal damnation? A more defensible theory may be that meaning is a matter of relation to a non-purposive God, and/or that meaning is a matter of perfecting some higher-order value, like moral purity; Metz thinks the most defensible supernatural claims incorporate these elements of “perfection” or “excellence.” But there are three glaring problems with any supernatural approach:

1.      Some lives appear to have meaning because of the absence of anything supernatural (the absence of any afterlife makes this life more valuable – a mortal life is surely more meaningful if it’s the only life we get)

2.      Some lives appear to have meaning despite the absence of anything supernatural (friendships, art, charity, love, new scientific discoveries… all are meaningful without requiring a supernatural reality).

3.      There is no compelling evidence that the supernatural exists

Metz discards all supernatural approaches to meaning, although he agrees that the existence of a supernatural reality/spiritual realm could enhance meaning (if it existed).

Naturalism – subjectivism and objectivism

PART III explores naturalism, the perspective that meaning exists in the natural world and requires no supernatural element. Subjective naturalism maintains that what makes a life meaningful depends on the subject and the subject’s “propositional attitudes” (e.g., wants, wills, desires, emotions, etc.). Objective naturalism argues that subjective attitudes aren’t sufficient, and rather that there are “certain states of affairs in the physical world [that] are meaningful ‘in themselves,’ apart from being the object of propositional attitudes.” Metz sides more with objectivism, because subjectivists often fail to clearly define key concepts (like “subjective attraction” or “pro-attitude”), but also because pure subjectivism can’t account for several intuitions we possess about meaning. For example, a subjectivist account would hold that any pleasurable or authentic act is meaningful… but what if you take pleasure in murder? Does that make it meaningful? Similarly, several unpleasant scenarios could be very meaningful, such as enduring pain to save a loved one from it. Metz then turns to objectivism, outlining three main forms, but still finds gaps and counterexamples that undermine each:

1.      Subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness: a life is meaningful when individuals are actively engaged in projects that have objective attractiveness/positive value – but what does “engaged” mean, and what is “objectively attractive?”

2.      Consequentialism: a life is meaningful if it increases the amount of relative good in the world – but what if that relative increase in good/well-being in the world was begot through immoral acts? Wouldn’t that subtract from the meaningfulness?

3.      Non-Consequentialism: a life is meaningful if you live it in the right way, regardless of whether that increases the amount of relative good in the world. Some historical proposals include: loving that which is worth loving (doesn’t account for other forms of meaning, though), pursuing transcendent values (but what’s the rational foundation for ascertaining these values?), enjoying creative pursuits (murder can be creative), or employing your rational intellect (why should rational inquiry eclipse other non-cognitive pursuits?).

Ultimately, Metz doesn’t find an existing natural subjectivist or objectivist approach to meaning in life that remains free from major objections or gaps.

The fundamentality theory

So, Metz proposes his own theory. Here it is:

“A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she, without violating certain moral constraints […], employs her reason and in ways that either positively orient rationality towards fundamental conditions of human existence, or negatively orient it towards what threatens them, such that the worse parts of her life cause better parts towards its ends by a process that makes for a compelling and ideally original life-story; in addition, the meaning in a human person’s life is reduced, the more it is negatively oriented towards fundamental conditions of human existence or exhibits narrative decline.”

Note: 1) that this theory accounts for ways a life could be more meaningful, without stating what makes a life on the balance meaningful; 2) the importance of narrative storytelling and that living a unique/original life is more meaningful than living some duplicate/unoriginal version; and 3) that this theory accounts for ways in which negative attitudes could make a life meaningful (e.g., hating injustice).  By “rationality,” Metz broadly means deliberation, decision-making, or judgement. From this standpoint, even emotions are rational because they require some judgement of worthiness/value (however conscious or unconscious). By “positively orient,” Metz means a wish that some object or end be realized… to want, appreciate, or pursue these valuable objects/ends. And by “fundamentality,” Metz means depth, “that of conditions that are largely responsible for many other conditions in a given domain.”

Because fundamentality is the core of this theory (and the least intuitive), let’s explore it exemplified in the good, the true, and the beautiful. Satisfying fundamentality in THE GOOD would include acting virtuously and achieving moral ideals in domains like equality, health, freedom, mental well-being, etc. – those conditions that impact much else about our lives. Satisfying fundamentality in THE TRUE might include studying and making important discoveries about DNA, atomic structure, or gravity, and contemplating and sharing insights about concepts like wealth, war, power, value, and meaning. Satisfying fundamentality in THE BEAUTIFUL could include creative accomplishments that speak to the deep universal themes of human experience – e.g., morality, death, peace, love – which are appreciated/admired by others. Fundamental conditions, then, Metz takes to be those conditions that are both universal and deeply relevant to human existence (that affect much else about it).

Here’s the short prescription: positively orient that big human brain of yours toward those areas and conditions that deeply impact the human experience, try to be original, and know that acting immorally subtracts from meaningfulness. Powerful sources of meaning include the good, the true, and the beautiful. Meaningful experiences are not always pleasurable experiences – don’t confuse meaning with happiness. Lastly, you don’t need God or purposeful design to live a meaningful life. To close: “. . . yes, dear reader, you may reasonably conclude that your life is, or at least could be, meaningful.”

Some parting thoughts on nihilism

Can a life have any meaning from the cosmic perspective though? If we widen the aperture, isn’t life meaningless? Shouldn’t we all be nihilists? 

“nihilists tend to get a hook into their interlocutor by appealing to considerations of magnitude or impact . . . I suspect the lingering longing for something greater than what is available to us human beings . . . is a function of our tendency to idealize . . . Our capacity to conceive of ever better states of affairs reaches to perfection, and, furthermore, our capacity to wish is insatiable . . . There are some who argue that wishing is rational, in the sense that it ought to cohere tightly with our judgements . . .

I deny that, however;

a wish is just a wish.”

In the final chapter, Metz has some important points to make about nihilism. The first is that if you wish for cosmic mattering, you’ll be disappointed. But why wish for it? Why take the point of view of the universe? If meaning evolved by natural selection, from Homo sapiens’ ability to make value judgements and pursue purposes, then only the human standpoint matters for meaning; the point of view of the universe has absolutely no bearing. Now, meaning may not be completely mind-dependent (subjectivism), but it evolved within human minds, which is to say, natural minds (not cosmic minds).  

You’ll notice, too, that nihilists are often inconsistent in their application of the cosmic perspective. They seem to know that pessimism is the correct orientation to life, that the absence of God is bad for humans, that procreation is wrong (if they’re also anti-natalist)… but if they can know all this “without appealing to a non-human standpoint,” why not for meaning? In other words, if terrestrial conditions are sufficient to inform our perspective on themes like morality and value, why not for meaning too? Why is meaning the only condition that requires a cosmic standard?

Metz’s position holds: your life can have meaning, even without any cosmic creator or observer.

IN SUM:

Is this book entirely secular? Yes.

If I had to describe the book in one sentence? Advancing a new theory on meaning in life.

Who should read this book? Philosophy students and those with an avid interest in meaning.